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pOLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION IN SOCIALIST FRANCE:
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES--ALTERNATIVE STRUGGLES
A unitary, strongly centralized state has characterized
French political thought and practice for centuries. The
Socialist Party broke from this tradition during its recent
tenure in national office when it passed a comprehensive
program of political decentralization. We consider these
recent changes in the structure of the French state from
pluralist, elitist, and ruling class perspectives, and conclude
that each of these traditional conceptualizations limits our
understanding of state power in various ways. We explore
the utility of a refined ruling class perspective known as
social capital, and suggest it offers insights into political
decentralization and state structure not provided by
alternative perspectives. We conclude by suggesting that
social capital holds promise for application to problems of
analytical and practical significance.
A strong central state capable of initiating political and
economic change from above has been a staple feature of French
political life for centuries, well ante-dating. the .absolutism of Louis
XIV. The French Revolution of 1789 and the subsequent rule of
Napoleon Bonaparte gave additional impetus to' this' tradition.
Even the republican governments of the 19th century continued to
consolidate increasing responsibility for local affairs in the
assorted Parisian ministries. In the 20th century, political parties
of both the left and right maintained the practice of imposing
solutions from above to perceived social and economic problems.
While the centraliza tion and consolidation of the political
authority of the state in Paris has dominated French political
development, criticism and reflection on the costs and consequences
of this trend has been ubiquitous as well. Much of the turbulence
characterizing the development of an enduring democratic state in
France has been due t.o the ongoing debate between the partisans of
centralism and pluralism, each trying to mold the state into its
idealized form.
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Debate over the form and structure of the state reached a
crucial turning' poin t when the recent (1981-1986) socialist
government introduced a program of political decentralization that
represented a sharp break with the tradition of centralized state
authority. In part a response to social movements for greater local
.con trol and worker setf'-managemen t as solutions to growing
centralization and technocracy, the socialist program also addressed
the party's pragmatic needs for policies that would attract and hold
~ts cons~ituency. We find the Fr~nch experience to be particularly
instructive for several reasons. FIrst, the Socialist Party controlled
both the executive and legislative branches of government of a
major capitalist democracy for a period of five years. This
provides a unique opportunity to observe how a socialist
government in office approached political change in a capitalist
society embedded in a Western capitalist economic system. Second
the strongly centralized unitary French state provides an
interesting contrast to the familiar federal state structure
ch ar ac te r i st ic of the United States, thereby encouraging the
development of conceptual analyses grounded in a more
comparative, international framework.
We examine these recent changes in the structure of the
French state from pluralist, elitist, and ruling class perspectives in
order to evaluate their utility in explaining political and economic
dissent and the government's response to it. An examination of the
French case leads us to suggest' that each of these familiar
theoretical approaches to socio-political processes and outcomes is
limited in ways that impede satisfactory analysis. We suggest that
a less restrictive and more insightful interpretation of French
political decentralization is provided by the alternative Marxist
approach known as social capital (Cleaver, 1979). The social
capital perspective maintains that acting on their own' behalf,
autonomous from the influences of capital, party leadership,
unions, or revolutionary vanguards, workers struggle against all
forms of the capitalist imposition' of work. The social capital
perspective submits that class struggle is centered in the
antagonism between capital's logical interest in imposing work,
accumulating surplus, and controlling the masses, and working class
interest in increasing the cost of la bor and resisting the discipline
of work.
Our purpose is to suggest an interpretation grounded in the
rationality of class struggle of the development and
implementation of the French political decentralization policies.
Using the social capital framework, we construe the socialist
political reform as an example of a capitalist state responding to
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workers' struggles. Further, we interpret the state's
decentralization response as a strategic counterattack that
attempted to placate some of the demands of the working class,
while maintaining the imposition of work as a legitimate form of
social control. We shall begin by tracing the development of the
French central state and then examine our varied theoretical
in terpretations.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRENCH CENTRAL STATE
The Socialist Party's decentralization policies represent an
historic break with the ancient French tradition of centralized
state power, and manifest their significance in that context. From
the late middle ages the nation-state in France was more tightly
centralized under the monarchy than other European nations. As
the monarchs of the ancien regime extended their reign
geographically they centralized it politically, making Paris the seat
of political power in France (Tocqueville, 1969, 1955; Dayries and
Dayries, 1982). During the monarchical period, an intendant in
each p r o v ince served as the personal decision-making
representative of the king. Local elites exercised little power since
the Intendant was authorized to make all important local decisions
except those requiring the advice of the king or his advisors, and
these decisions were routinely sent to Paris. Because the monarchy
was occasionally forced to compromise on regional particularisms
to secure the cooperation of local notables, some institutions such
as courts and customs duties varied from province to province
(Dayries and Dayries, 1982). On the eve of the revolution, France
was a strongly centralized state, but ..in a political arrangement
which necessarily tolerated some degree of variation in local
privileges.
The revolution of 1789 started a cycle of alternating
revolutionary and reactionary regimes that successively shaped and
reshaped the state into forms suitable for implementing their goals.
With few exceptions, these varied regimes continued the
centralization of political power in Paris, following the example of
the ancien regime. For the Jacobin radical, centralization was
essential for securing the revolution and extending its benefits to
the nation. Suppression of the aristocracy and the creation of a
democratic, unified nation free of particularistic privileges
required reform from above. Conversely, for reactionaries
centralization was necessary to preserve public order. Tocqueville
(1969:97) argues that the revolution was, "...both republican and
cen tralizing."
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The Gaullist Era
With the collapse of the Fourth Republic in 1958 over the
Algerian imbroglio, the Fifth Republic under de Gaulle ushered in
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Jacobin central state versus the Girondist pluralist, decentralized
state. For many, the very notion of elected regional governments
seemed to be in opposition to republican traditions of national
unity and the general interest (Rangeon, 1982:66). Thus the
political leadership of the Fourth Republic largely believed that
any newly-created intermediate levels of government should
function as downward transmitters of policies developed by the
central state. This view embraced a continuation of the traditional
statist view so prevalent in 18th and 19th century French political
thought. At the same time, the post World War II decades witnessed
the growth of regional identities based on developing definitions of
local interests and aspirations, often centering around a commonly
shared and strongly identified regional or ethnic background. Two
growing conceptions of regionalism began to emerge: the
administrative view of regional reform imposed from above and a
growing consciousness of regional identities and interests
developing from below. ,
The legislative record of the Fourth Republic largely reflects
the gradual growth of regional governments imposed by the central
state and structured in ways to serve its administrative needs
rather than the aspirations of local communities. In 1956, at the
initiative of the Planning Commissariat, a government decree
divided France into 22 economic programming regions (Dayries
and Dayries, 1982:27). While these early regions were created by
the state to administer its economic plans, they were seen by local
economic and political notables as potential vehicles for asserting
their shared interests. This early articulation of shared interests
grew in future years into a greater sense of regional community in
many areas of. France. The regional initiatives of the Fourth
Republic set in motion a developing dialectic of thesis and response
between the central state and local communities that' planted' the
first tentative seeds of growing regional identity. While
regionalization in France began as an exercise in meeting the
administrative needs of the state, it paradoxically awakened long
dormant regional identities which gradually gained strength over
the decade. Much of the development of regional government in
France is a direct result of this continuing dialectic between the
administrative needs of the state and the growing aspirations of
local communities for more direct control over their economic and
social futures.
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As the revolution proceeded by fits and turns, Napoleon
Bonaparte was crowned emperor in 1804. Suleiman (1974:13)
argues, "The structure of the modern French state owes more to
Napoleon than to any of his predecessors or successors." Napoleon's
desire to create a new social order continued the centralization of
decision making. He abolished the intendants, replacing them with
a prefectoria1 arrangement in which centrally appointed prefects.
represented the interests of the state in each department, an
arrangement that has lasted to the present day.' The Napoleonic
centralization resulted not only from imperialistic impulses but
also from the continuing need to abolish local privileges and secure
the revolution. Napoleon's aims were consistent with the widely
prevailing Jacobin view that a strong central state was necessary
for securing liberty, equality, and fraternity, thereby preventing
the abuses of special interests.
The Third Republic of 1875 was the first sustained,
constitutional democracy in France. Under the republic, political
change took place at the ballot box rather than the barricade. The
republican emphasis on equality, order, unity, and glory required a
strong state to suppress the church and create a system of secular
public institutions, especially public education (Zeldin, 1973).
Durkheim's concern with moral authority and public education
reflects the social and political concerns prevalent during the
Third Republic. From its inception in 1875 until its demise in the
face of the Nazi invasion of 1940, the legislative record of the -
Third Republic reflects a continuing trend toward the "
centralization of political power in Paris. Though new legislation
granted a modicum of local authority to the commune and
department (Lalumiere, 1982~; Vjrieux, 1982), republicanism in
... '. 2
France continued the strong state tradition.
·,·Following World War·-I-I;', the Fourth (1945-1958) and Fifth .'
Republics (1958-present) faced increasingly complex social,
economic, and political problems. Pressing issues such as urban"
growth, population shifts, economic planning, and industrial
development invited state intervention. The difficulties of
adequately administering detailed economic and social plans from
the Parisian ministries became increasingly apparent with the
adoption of central economic planning in 1946. Though most
political leaders on the left, center, and right .believed the state
must take responsibility for solving economic and social problems,
they likewise increasingly recognized the need for an intermediate
administrative level of government (Dayries and Dayries, 1982).
Arguments about the nature and structure of regional
government reflected the historic debate between partisans of the
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a new constitution and a vision for France's future based on a
centralized, technocratic state in which social and economic
problems would be solved by policies developed by the central
state. De Gaulle espoused a corporatist view that assumed reforms
would be imposed from above rather than developed from below.
This ideology shaped the Gaullist approach to regional
decentralization. Local consultation and participation were not to
be major components of regional reform (Suleiman, 1974).
Regional decentralization did not mean a transfer of authority and
decision making to governments elected locally, but rather a
deconcentration of state authority in which locally based central
authorities would be given greater latitude in making local
decisions. Safran (1977:226) indicates that not only did Gaullists
fear powerful regional assemblies potentially controlled by anti-
Gaullist politicians, the Communists likewise opposed
decentralization for ideological reasons. Beer (1980:39) notes that
the French Communist Party was hostile to autonomism since it
was attached to a policy of democratic centralism, but that the
Socialist Party, with its developing stress on local self-management,
fa vored enhanced local control over local matters.
Because both Gaullists and Communists feared a weakening
of the unitary central sta te (Berger, 1974), the Gaullists developed
a regional program grounded in central state solutions to local
social and economic problems. Once again the structure of the
sta te was reshaped to sui t the interests of its leadership. Gaullist
decree laws in 1959 and 1969 created 22 regional administrative
districts that in 1964 were placed under the direction of regional
prefects (Dayries and Dayries, 1982). Decrees issued in 1968 and
1970 further deconcentrated state authority but withheld any
regional autonomy; the state-appointed regional prefect soon
emerged" as the dominant political 'force in the region. These
Gaullist regional reforms were designed largely to accommodate
central economic planning and adjust the periphery to the political
and economic decisions made at the center (Chevallier, 1982:112-
114).
The growing technocratic and bureaucratic character of state
administration in the absence of substantive regional devolution
and self-determination climaxed in May 1968 when France
experienced a student and worker revolt that momentarily
paralyzed the nation and brought the government to the verge of
collapse. In the absence of active support from the Communist
Party, however, the state soon restored order and the government
did not fall. Gaullists took this major crisis as a sign that an active
program of political decentralization designed to enhance citizen
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participation in political and economic decisions was necessary. In
1969 de Gaulle iunveiled a reform package emphasizing regional
economic and social development (Dayries and Dayries, 1982:33).
Under his proposed reform the- regions were to receive enhanced
decision-making authority over economic and social concerns but
would have less autonomy of action than had historically been the
case for the commune and the department.
The reform proposal required a constitutional amendment
that was submitted to the electorate in a referendum package along
with several other political changes. The Gaullist leadership
received an unexpected setback when in April 1969 the referendum
proposal was defeated for a variety of reasons, many of them
unrelated to the proposed regional reform (La Documentatio-n
Francaise, 1982:20-23; Lalumiere, 1982a:48-52). The referendum
had largely become an evaluation of de Gaulle's policies and its
defeat led to de Gaulle's resignation as he had threatened. The
successor Pompidou government created 22 administrative regions
in 1972 that seemingly offered citizens an opportunity for greater
participation in local matters, but still did not provide for elected
regional governments. This arrangement suited the Gaullists"
desire to maintain a strong central state and yet appear responsive
to the unrest of 1968.
In 1974 the Gaullists lost control of the government with the
election of a moderate centrist as president, Giscard d'Estaing.
Giscard won the presidency by advocating a diminished role for
the central state with corresponding increased authority for local
and regional governments (Lancel, 1974). Once in office, however,
Giscard's public rhetoric of a more pluralist, less centralist state
increasingly departed from his actions (Rousseau, 1981). As an
economic technocrat Giscard was ultimately committed to his view
of rational economic planning directed by the state. He
increasingly enunciated the conservative view that economic
growth equally benefitted all citizens and helped to neutralize
social and economic conflict (Birnba um, 1982: 112-137). In practice,
the state-sponsored economic modernization of the Giscard era
essentially benefitted large corporations at the expense of the
traditional middle class, small entrepreneurs, and workers.
Giscard's ruling coalition of state technocrats, bureaucrats, private
sector capitalists, and industrialists united the political, economic,
and administrative elites in France more effectively than ever
before (Birnbaum, 1982; Sulieman, 1978). This economically and
ideologically unified order opposed the creation of autonomous
regions with their own social and economic powers.
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with economic nationalization, offered a positive program for
opening up French society to greater citizen participation.
The ideological shift by the socialists on the regional question
resulted not only from a change in political philosophy, but was a
pragmatic response to the realities of Gaullist dominance as well.
Since the Gaullists dominated the central government in the 1960s
I and 1970s, the left cultivated political power and office holding at
I" the local level. A growing local constituency propelled the Socialist
. Party to become increasingly receptive to demands from below forI the creation of popularly ·elected regional assemblies. As a staff
t member of the Socialist Party delegation in the National Assembly
indicated to the senior author (Rousseau, July 6, 1982), since the
right monopolized power at the national level the left was forced
to develop its power base at the local and regional level. The re-
emergence of local ethnic and cultural identities following World
War II constituted yet another force for greater regional autonomy.
The socialists' emphasis on local governance and worker self-
management meshed smoothly with the growing demands of ethnic
activists for increased regional autonomy (Beer, 1980). Regional
devolution in France is thus a complex social and political
phenomenon reflecting diverse struggles for political and economic
power in an ever-changing milieu. The socialists' embrace of
po l i tical decen traliza tion was a reaction too the bureaucra tic
hierarchy that stifled local initiatives as well as a pragmatic
response to their own electoral position (Ardagh, 1983; Godt, 1983;
. Crozier, 1982).
The surprising victory of the Socialist Party in winning the
Presidency and an absolute majority in the National Assembly in
1981 brought the growing debate over statism into a new. political
context.f Upon taking office the socialists moved speedily on a
package 'of decentralization measures they .b-ad promised.
Introduced in 1981, the initial package of decentralizing legislation
became law March 2, 1982. The historic law of 1982 was but a first
step in an ongoing stream of legislation and decrees (Gontcharoff
and Milano, 1983, 1984) that continued through the duration of the
socialist majori ty in parliament, which ended in 1986. The new
legislation fashioned the prior 22 administrative regions into
functional units of territorial government with popularly elected
regional councils chosen through direct election. The state-
appointed prefect no longer serves as chief executive of the region;
regional councils now select a president from among their own
members. The degree of self-direction given to the region varies
depending upon the subject-matter. Regions will exercise
considerably enhanced control over some matters whereas in other
I
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The Socialist Government's Decentralization Of 1981-1986
The recent socialist political decentralization must be
understood in light of this three-century context. The centralized
nature of the French state derives from a particular set of
historical traditions which assume the central state to be the
indispensable and impartial arbiter of the general collective
interest (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983; Suleiman, 1974). This
perspective supposes that only the state can rise above narrow
particularistic interests and neutrally arbitrate conflicts between
special-interest groups. A peculiarly French view of the state, it
has been both a cause and consequence of centralized sta.te power
in France and has resulted in state imposed solutions to social and
economic problems. Political formations on both the left and right
ha ve largely shared this perception of the sta te, opposing
decentralizing reforms that would alter historic patterns of central
power. As Debbasch (1982) writes, modern democracies have
attempted to strike a balance between the need for national unity
expressed in centralized political power and the recognition of
local diversity expressed in decentralized political power. While
the attempt to resolve this complex balance has historically
produced alternating tendencies toward the centralization and
decentralization of state power in France, the dominant trend has
been increased centralization. Putnam (1976:90) writes that, It •••the
formulation of society's agenda of unresolved problems is usually a
vi:tual monopoly of the political elite....n In France, political
elites of both the left and right have largely espoused the necessity
of a dominant central state.
. Political 'parties on the left in France have historically
viewed concentrated state power. as a necessary prerequisite for
'working class control of the state and "the subsequent imposition of
.central "economicp.lanning. ....:Both.- the. Socialist and Communist
Parties opposed regionalism as a diversion from the primary goal
of heightened class conflict leading to the seizure of state power by
the working class. However, the student-led uprising of 1968
which enjoyed the active support of portions of the working class:
led both socialists and communists to moderate their views on the
regional question. The 1972 Common Program of the Socialist and
Communist Parties proclaimed that the regions should be
transformed from administrative districts into territorial units of
local government with popularly elected regional assemblies. The
Socialist Party saw regional devolution -as a constructive response
to the Gaullist and centrist drift toward growing centralization and
technocracy. The socialists believed regional devolution, coupled
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areas responsibilities are shared with the central state, whose
authority remains dominant. Enlarged areas of regional
responsibility include decisions about housing, town planning,
economic development aid to local industry, public health and
welfare, and the like. Conversely, matters such as public works,
inter-regional economic development, and cultural, health, and
social matters of national significance remain largely within the
purview of the central state. Administrative courts have been
given the responsibility of distinguishing between exclusive and'
shared regional powers.
As with the region, the president of the departmental council
has become the chief executive of the department, replacing the
former departmental prefect. Prefects continue to be appointed by
the central state but their responsibilities have been considerably
changed as reflected in their new title: Representative of the State.
In place of the former role as chief executive of the department or
region, the Representative of the State now plays an expanded role
in carrying out central state responsibilities. The Representative of
the State represents each national ministry in the department and
region and coordinates the local delivery of ministerial services,
protects the national interest, and enforces the law.
Representatives of the State may no longer suppress a priori the
initiatives taken at local levels of government, as occurred prior to
decentralization. Now, when Representatives of the State believe
departmental or regional legislation conflicts with state policy,
they may appeal the legislation to administrative tribunals for
adjudication; however, local initiatives remain in effect until the
results of the appeal are determined. This change in the tutelary
authority of the state representa t ive initiates a considerable ':ic
departure from past practice and strengthens local governments.:";~
Changes in tax policy will ostensibly provide local'_:~_-:'
governments greater financial support from the state as well as]
greater discretion in its expenditure (Merry, 1984). However, likej:
much of the rest of the industrialized capitalist world, the-]
economic crisis in France has and likely will continue to limit the'~~(­
amount of funds the central state makes available to local;:~,
governments (Kesselman, 1983). The crisis-induced tendency to-;kf
limit state taxation and expenditure for social welfare measuresY
will impair the ability of local governments to generate revenues..,?s
Thus regional decentralization seems unlikely to alter the great ';If
economic inequalities between wealthier and poorer regions and, -.~
departments. Because the socialist government wished to avoid'·i,
conflicts potentially damaging to its interests, it side-stepped the-~l~'
politically difficult Question of the exact division of powers among .:~~~
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the three levels of local government, commune, department, and
region. Administrative courts will decide this matter as specific
issues are resolved.
Although regional decentralization represents a first
departure from the Jacobin statist traditions of the past,
constitutionally, France remains a unitary state in which central
power remains pr imar y and indivisible because this power
presently granted by the National Assembly to local government
can also be withdrawn. The conception of the national interest
defined by those who head the central state has a large impact on
the character of regional powers and- presently gives the regions
decision-making authority within an institutional framework that
tends to reproduce the logic of the central state. Meny (1984)
properly observes that the socialist reforms are not a revolution in
state-local relations, but rather the transfer of a perceptible
amount of power from the state to local governments, the longer-
term outcomes of which remain uncertain. Some (e.g. Rangeon,
1982) have argued that regional decentralization' will likely result
in little more than an increased centralization of power at local
levels of government principally benefitting regional and local
elites. The Jacobin tradition clearly remains quite powerful in
France (Vie, 1982), and the election of the conservative
parliamentary majority in 1986 might portend a shift toward the
more centralist policies of the past. This seems unlikely in the
near-term, however, since the conservatives currently hold power in
20 of the 22 regional assemblies and are desirous of maintaining
support among local constituencies, most of whom favor
regionalism. Though the present conservative government has
introduced no major regional initiatives to date, it has begun to de-
nationalize the industries and banks nationalized by the socialists
during their term' in office..
PLURALIST, ELITIST, RULING CLASS,
AND SOCIAL CAPITAL PERSPECTIVES
Reflecting both ideological and analytical interests, scholars
typically interpret socio-political processes and outcomes from
pluralist, elitist, or ruling class perspectives (e.g Domhoff, 1983:203-
223). The underlying assumptions of each perspective raise
different questions that define and limit their analytical scope.
Although we recognize the utility of pluralist, elitist, and ruling
class perspectives, we maintain that each limits its respective focus
in ways that leave analyses of the state incomplete. We wish to
argue that a developing Marxian perspective known as social
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Elitism
Emphasizing the central importance of political and economic
structures, elitist theorists ask 'who governs?' Following the work
of Weber, elitists argue that those who control the means of
administration by occupying top positions in dominant business,
government, and military institutions, hold political power (.Weber,
1946:221-224; Mills, 1956; Suleiman, 1974, 1978; Bad1e and
Birnbaum, 1983; Birnbaum, 1982). Elitists frequently maintain that
while political power issues -principally from the bureaucratic
institutions of government, it is influenced by those who hold key
economic positions (Mills, 1956; Dye, 1976; Domhoff, 1983).
From an elitist perspective, the socialist government's
political and economic policies from 1981 to 1986 clearly suggest a
mixed record. The Socialist Party's embrace of-regionalism and the
subsequent creation of popularly elected regional governments were
enhanced by the party's attempt to cultivate an electoral power
base Oat the local and regional level. While the socialists f'ulf illed
their electoral promise to" ° create regional .governments giving
citizens greater decision-making authority over local matters, they
also continued to impose from above corporatist, pro-capitalist
policies that sustained the prevailing distribution of political and
economic power.
Several actions reflect clearly the Socialist Party's intent to
maintain policies that facilitated the reproduction of
institutionalized political and economic power. The socialist
government passed no legislative initiatives that might have
substantially altered two political institutions constituting a major
foundation of concentrated state power and elite rule, the grandes
ecoles and grands corps. Suleiman (1978) has shown how these
institutions produce and maintain a state-sponsored political and
economic ruling elite that is unique to France. The grandes ecoles
~ap!tal offers an approach to state-class relations that expands OUr
tnSIg~tS b~;:ond the ?Ior e conventional directions taken bPlural~~t;oe;eItdIsett'a~nl·d rUtlhIng CI~sls the?riles. y I,i."•._
. 1 I~g e. s.ocla capita perspective, we will btiefly
characterize ~lur~ltst, el itist, and ruling class views of the state.OU\~hah~~chter1zhatIolnof .these perspectives is not exhaustive; rather;
we 19 19 t t e p uranst, eli tist, and ruling class poin ts of view Imerel~ to suggc:st how ea.ch perspective centers its attention on !
certa m analytIcal questions while neglecting other political '
processes and outcomes. I
I
I
I
I
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Pluralism
We ~ill begin by suggesting how pluralist conceptions of the
state.deftne. key questions and limit their analytical scope.
ASSOCIated with American social sciences of the 1950s and 1960s
(Cox ~t aI, 1?~5:108), pluralists primarily ask 'who wins?' For
plur.altsts, polt~Ical power represents one's ability to make others
act In ways whI~h they would not normally behave (Dahl, 1957:202-
203). Presupposmg that many political actors compete for limited
SOCIal rewards (e.g. prestige, money, jobs, and the like) pluralists
focus their investigations of the state on the observable political
pro.cess~s of electi~ns and policy making. The pluralist approach
mamtatns that while those who compete for limited social rewards
are not absolute ~olitical equals, democratically elected
governments. es~entIaIIy balance ri val in terests (Dahl, 1967).
Further,. despite Imperfect political equality, according to pluralist
perspecnvss, all individuals in democratic societies have the
potential to pursue their goals (Dahl, 1967).
Giv~n !hese assumptions, a pluralis~approach to French
.?ecentralIzatIOn would focus on socialists winning office and
Implement!n.g their regional reform-programs. Moreover ap~ural!st perspective would argue that subsequent conservative ..
VIC!o.rIes .were the result of democra tic processes balancing rivalpol~ttC~1 interests. The pendulum-like movements from centrist, to
sOC.I~hst, to c~nser~ative governments would suggest shifting
poltt.Ical constttuencIes, changing political participation, and a
sharing of power through democratic processes. In sum, a pluralistwelta~s~hauungwould attempt to explain the socialists' victory by
examIn~ng.w.ho participa tes in insti tutional poli tical processes.
. Li m i t i n g their analyses primarily to observable
Ins ~i tu tionali~ed poli tical processes (such as elections, la w-making,
!'oltcy formation, and the like), pluralists typically regard economic
mfluences as external factors. Rather than perceiving economic
structures as creating substantially fixed class interests that
56
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educate the technocrats and bureaucrats who staff the high state
administration, thereby according the state a virtual monopoly on
the creation and certification of political and economic elites. The
grands corps comprise the specialized administrative agencies
heading the vast organizational apparatus of the central state.
These two interrelated institutions have, since Napoleon, served as
a bastion of vast personal privilege and political-economic power
that benefit those tied to capitalist rule (Ardagh, 1983). Nor did
the socialists move actively to limit the cumul des mandats, the
French practice that allows elected officials to hold multiple
political offices, thereby further concentrating power in the hands
of a few. In central economic planning as well, little substantial ~
change from past practice occurred. While the regions now have
somewhat greater scope for developing intra-regional economic
plans and consulting with the state, economic planning still remains
largely a prerogative of the central state. As Wahl (Beer, 1980:xxix..
xxx) observed even prior to the socialist assent to office in 1981,
"On the basis of past experience the left in power quickly loses
much of its decentralizing fervor....while the Socialist Party's.
program offers 'lip service to regional government, the bulk of its
reforms requires rather massive centralized controls rather than a
Girondist devolution' of power." Wahl's assessment is apt today.
The socialists' policies while in office were essen tially
reformist. Neither their ideology nor their legislative program
challenged the fundamental political and economic structures of
state or society. In spite of their regional initiative, the socialist
government followed a largely liberal, coporatist, reform program
based on policy formation from above. While they were indeed
more solicitous of working class and local demands than prior
conservative governments, 'the socialis'ts'remained committed to a
political-economic program grounded in the basic logic -of capitalist '
rule. As Singer (1986a, 1986b) observes, given the current
conjuncture in France and the world-wide capi talist economic
crisis, the opportuni ty for other than reformist policies was nil.
Singer argues that insufficient pressure from below due to the
decline of militant mass movements in the years following 1968
meant that the socialist government was not and could not be a
workers government. He notes, as ha ve others, that after a brief
initial attempt the socialists were forced to abandon an
expansionist economic policy in the face of France's existence
within a stagnant capitalist world economy. Since vital worker
movements at the factory and local level were absent, the lack of
pressure from what might have been its natural constituency meant
that the Socialist Party pursued economic and social reformism
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directed from above. The Party essentially arg~ed.that. it would be
better qualified to reform and manage capitalism m favo.r ?f
orker interests than the parties of the right. Thus the SOCIalIst
;arty carried out policies that reproduced existing political ~nd
economic structures since the necessary ~rou~dw?~k for radical
action was absent. As Singer (1986a:l~)wr i tes, ...It s the apparent
resignation of the people, the weakening or t~mporary destru~t.lon
of the idea that you can radically change Iif'e through political
action...which is most serious, and which. the ~e~t must try to
everse." The parallel political and economic pol icies of the left~nd right seem to exhibit a broad continuity, .and the 1981 sociali.st
government was no exception. To be sure, Important elements.1D
the Socialist Party and the government favored a more active
decentralization policy and the involvement of extra-governmental
constituencies in the policy process (Aujac, 1986). Nonetheless, as
Aujac (1986) demonstrates, with the e~ce~ti?~ of na.tionali~i~g
addi tional industrial en terprises, the sOCI~IIstS Industrial pol~c~es
were remarkably similar to those of their predecessors, policies
which primarily benefitted an expansion of the power of the state
bureaucracy and large enterprises (private and state owned) over
small ones.
Berger (1986:3-8) has likewise noted the drift of portions of
the left, particularly the socialists, toward reformist political and
economic policies that reflect a diminution of the ideology of class
conflict. She argues that the left in France is undergoing a
fundamental transformation as electoral support for the
Communist Party has virtually collapsed and the Socialist Par.ty is
rapidly moving in a direction of greater acceptance of private
enterprise, and the market. Berger attributes these changes to
massive recent shifts in public values and beliefs toward broader
support for' economic and political policies based on private
property and the market. In her view, left and right in Franc~ may
be converging .more closely toward the center as each begins to
redefine its ideological positions. She believes France may be
coming to more closely resemble the Anglo-American p~ttern ba~ed
on the regular alternation of center-left and. cerrter-right parries.
Whatever the validity of Berger's assessment, It suggests once agam
that the socialists' five years of parliamentary governance
produced policies of a reformist nature leading to the maintenan.ce
of existing political and economic institutional po.wer. WhIle
political decentralization has expanded the poss i bl e sc?pe.of
regional government, it remains to be seen whether decent~a.llzation
will actually place greater power in the hands of local crtizens or
merely replicate the Jacobin pattern of the central state and lead to
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was considerably more responsi ve than prior conservative
governments to demands from below for greater regional autonomy.
The statist approach to regionalism taken by conservative
governments had dialectically shaped an unintended and enhanced I'
sense of local awareness within regions, many of which shared
common economic, ethnic, and cultural interests to which the
socialists responded. In short, such a ruling class perspective would· I"
interpret the· French decentralization policies as a move front •
concentrated power serving the interests of capital to a more"
equitable, less centralized distribution of power benefiting the 'I'
working class.
Although .recent ruling class perspectives have attempted to t::
make greater allowance for relative' state autonomy, these I
approaches- typically equate the actions of workers' political, r
parties, unions, and revolutionary vanguards with working class
interests, thereby theoretically ruling out the possibility of
workers' autonomy from those very organizations. In Accumulation,
Crisis, O'Connor (1984, especially pp. 7-9, 18-21, 109-118, and 196-
199) points out that an adequate Marxist theory of the state must
recognize the autonomy of workers to struggle on their own behalf.
We submit that more satisfying analyses of the state must allow for
the relative autonomy of workers and explore the significance of,
non-structural forms of political power.
Social Capital »,
The above discussion of pluralist, elitist, and ruling class...
theories has suggested tha t al though all three perspectives have.>'
some analytical utility, their theoretical blind spots amply Illustrater,
tharone's perception of political processes .and outcomes depends."
upon one's initial assumptions about political and economic, power.:~'I·
In the present analysiszwe have' seen' ho-w' assumptions about power ~~~-.
shaped various theoretical interpretations of French pol it icalEl
decentralization. While acknowledging the influence of pluralist, '~'k"1
elitist, and ruling class perspectives on our analysis, our present]
objective is to recast their basic assumptions in order to explore the:':~F,
analytical utility of an alternative perspective, social capital. Weo~~~~
hold that the following assumptions produce a different, fuller,:~E,
and more satisfactory interpretation of political-economic processesJ],
and ou tcomes:" ..:~
a) economic and political structures are sources of power;,:}l
b) domi~an t capitalist str~ct~res are t~e. primary condition.•.~·.'.·~.~.~.;.~~.:.1
shap irig the charac te r ist ics of pol i t ic a l processes and..:~J,
outcomes in capitalist societies;~,;j~:
~Ii
c) both the state and the working class are relatively
autonomous from the influences of capital;
d) consequential non-bureaucratic, non-structural forms of
power exist;
e) and workers can initiate struggles on their own behalf,
autonomous from so-called workers organizations.
The reader should note that these assumptions are not simply the
result of ad hoc theory construction; to the contrary, theorists
associated with the Marxian perspective known as social capital
have developed similar assumptions.
We will now briefly outline the history and theoretical
emphases of the social capital perspective in order to provide a
broader view of what some have identified as an important
advance in Marxist scholarship (McNall, 1984:488; O'Connor,
1984:7-8). Characterizing their perspective as a significant
departure from orthodox mechanical Marxism, the social capital
genealogy includes an American Trotskyist group in the 1940s, the
French journal Socialisme Ou Barbarie from the 1940s to the 1960s,
the Italian New Left in the 1960s and 1970s, and recent Marxists
writing from a strategic, worker point of view (Cleaver, 1979:45-66;
de Rouffignac, 1982:108-125).
Over the years, beginning with its early departure from
Marxist orthodoxy in the 1940s, social capital theorists have
developed two primary emphases. First, social capital contends
that, "...all labor is working directly or indirectly, in household or
in factory, to maintain or reproduce..." capitalism (Bell, 1977:187).
Such an emphasis suggests that the working class performs both
waged and unwaged work (Cleaver, 1979:40-75). The social capital
conception of unwaged work goes well beyond the typical Marxist
view of surplus value as aconsequ"ence' of the unpaid portion 'of
the working day. Social capital theorists argue that the unwaged
labor of houseworkers, children, students, the unemployed, and
peasants is absolutely necessary for capitalist production of profit
since it is their labor that produces and reproduces the ability and
capacity of workers to work (Cleaver, 1979:175; Dalla Costa and
James, 1972; Tronti, 1972, 1973.) In short, social capital maintains
that unwaged work is necessary to accumulate both surplus value
and a working class.
Second, the social capital perspective stresses the relative
autonomy of workers from the influences of capital and workers
organizations. As Cleaver (1979:44) has observed, "...the self-
activity of the [working] class...makes it more than a victimized
cog in the machinery of capital and more than a fragmented mass
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requiring instruction in its class interests." Social capital
emphasizes the autonomous power of workers to initiate action in
furtherance of their own interests. For social capi tal theorists,
workers have often struggled without the leadership of unions,
parties, or revolutionary vanguards. Indeed, at times, because such
institutions have stood in opposition to their interests, workers
have struggled against their official representatives.
These emphases of social capi tal are significant in this article
because they help to identify logical class interests. Put simply, the
interests of capital are to impose waged and unwaged work upon
the vast majority in order to accumulate surplus value (typically
accomplished by keeping the costs of labor low) and to accumulate
a class of individuals (workers) working to maintain a capitalist
social order. The interests of working class members are to
increase the price of their labor (including making previously
unwaged work waged), thus reducing capital's appropriation of
surplus value, and to decrease the time spent working for capital.
Here one should not confuse class interests with class
sympathies. For example, organizations that identify themselves
with the working class but pursue goals that maintain a socio-
economic system based on the imposition of waged and unwaged
work and the accumulation (either capitalist or socialist) of surplus
wealth do not act in the interests of workers. Viewed from the
perspective of social capi tal, the historic task of the working class
is not to manage capital better than capitalists, but to struggle to
end capitalist social systems based on the imposition of work and
the exploitation of labor. In sum, the historic task of the working
class is to cease producing and reproducing a class subjected to
work, to bid Farewell To The Working Class (Gorz, .1982).
Social capital's theoretical emphases and identification of
class 'interests suggest an' 'alternative interpretation of French
political decentralization. From this perspective, May 1968 marked
the climax of autonomous worker struggles. Thousands of waged
workers and unwaged worker students seized factories and
classrooms, erected street barricades, demanded improvements in
the quality of their lives, including greater control over their work,
and insisted on increased compensation for their labor (Cleaver,
1979:51). This uprising of waged and unwaged workers, with
demands for greater autonomy in their lives and work, began to
influence the Socialist Party's views on power, bureaucracy, and
regionalism. It also demonstrated that workers acting on their own
behalf were capable of employing non-institutional forms of power
to influence government policies. Indeed, as Tilly (1986) shows,
French workers and citizens have long attempted to sh ape
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government policies through mass protest and popular struggle.
Thus, a social capital perspective implies that the creation of
popularly elected regional governments represented a response to
workers' demands for more autonomy and control over the political
and economic conditions of their lives.
The revolt of 1968 had additional significance because it
surprised and threatened the legitimacy of the government, as well
as the Communist and Socialist Parties. The legitimacy of the state
was threatened since workers were exercising a form of political
power external to bureaucratic authority, regulation, and control;
likewise, the legitimacy of the Communist and Socialist Parties was
threatened for exactly the same reasons. If the communists or
socialists could no longer legitimately claim the loyalty of workers,
could no longer legitimately assert that they alone had the
authority to decide whether workers would strike or stay at their
jobs, then the basis for Communist and Socialist Party power
within the state bureaucracy and leadership of the working class
became problematic. Hence, the reply of the Socialist Party to
pressures from its constituency below included not only a changed
ideology toward regionalism but also an adaptation to the
pragmatic realities of economic power and electoral politics as well.
Moreover, after the revolt of 1968 the French government,
and particularly the Socialist and Communist Parties, had to
develop strategies that would reassert the necessity of bureaucratic
control and the imposition of work. As Singer (1986b:22) has noted,
the French state, as well as the Communist and Socialist Parties'
had to channel workers ". .back into purely parliamentary
[bureaucratic] waters...." Using a social capital approach, we can
suggest that .May, 1968 was the climax of an autonomous workers'
offensive. The French state, the onus falling primarily on the
Communist- and Socialist Parties, had to design a counteroffensive'
to bring workers back under bureaucratic control and to reassert
the legitimacy of the imposition of work. These pro-capitalist
policies suggest that while workers and capitalists contend for
power in the political arena of the state, the struggle is an unequal
one even though workers are not powerless.
The socialists found new electoral prominence in the years
after the 1968 revolt because they were not directly associated with
the government policies that precipitated the crisis, they did not
betray the revolt as had the Communist Party, and their embrace of
local determination cultivated a popular constituency. In the 1960s
and 1970s the socialists pragmatically adopted the causes of factory
workers demanding more control over the workplace as well as
those of ethnic, cultural, and regional communities with common
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In this article we have traced the development of' the
centralized French state and the Socialist Party's recent
decentralization policies. We offered possible pluralist, elitist, and
ruling class interpretations of the these developments as well as an
alternative interpretation based on a neo-Marxian approach known
as social capital. Using this social capital perspective we have.
"suggested that French decentralization can best be viewed within a
broader framework of class struggle. In this framework, the
Socialist Party's decentralization program represents victories for
both the working. class and capital. We have attempted .to show ..
how the social capital approach offers a more satisfying analysis
because it accounts for economic and political structures of power,
which pluralist perspectives largely ignore, and because it stresses
the autonomous actions of workers, .helping us to comprehend
popular sources of power and non-institutional forms of struggle,
which elitist and other ruling class perspectives tend to neglect.
Having explored several analytical interpretations of the
state, we now briefly suggest some practical implications of these
competing theories. A pluralist perspective implies that political
practice requires a commitment to constitutional democracy in an
open political system where a multitude of political interests
compete for scarce rewards, and yet maintain a relative balance of
power between competing interests (Gamson, 1975). For pluralists,
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identities who called for greater local determination. The Socialist
Party embraced decentralization in order to build local
consti tuencies since the Ga ullists, and to a lesser ex ten t the
Communist Party (especially through the C.G.T., the general labor
confederation), dominated national political institutions.
Eventually, the Socialist Party's stress on regional decentralization
bore fruit with its electoral victories in 19·81.
To the extent that the decentralization reforms, inspired from"
the bottom and administered from the top, have given workers the
possibility for greater control over political institutions one can
interpret them as genuine working class victories. A1t;rnatively,
however, the social capital perspective also suggests that the
Socialist Party program, beginning with the 1972 Common Program
and ending with the Socialist Party's parliamentary defeat in 1986
was a triumph for capital since bureaucratic control based on the
imposition of waged and unwaged work was reestablished. The
Socialist Party simply followed the model of responsible Euro-
socialism based on the discipline of waged and unwaged labor and
a commitment to the capitalist world order. Further, the transition
from centrist, to socialist, to conservative governments in France
from the 1950s to the 1980s resulted in changes in the managers of
capital, but not in the position of workers. One can attribute the
recent shift in the composition of the government to a widespread
perception that the socialists were less adept at managing capital
than the conservatives (Singer, 1986a:11-16). Thus, each moment,
working class 'victory' and capital 'triumph,' points to the ongoing
attack-counterattack movements of class struggle. The social
capital perspective helps us see how both sides in this ongoing
struggle, workers and capital alike, are likely to initiate
.autonomous off'ensives," even though the dominant structures of
capitalism tend .to condition .outcornes often, but.not exclus'ivelycin
ways that further the interests of capital.
Recent attempted reforms of the French higher education
system and subsequent student protests : constitute yet another
example of class struggle (Dickson, 1986; Ireland, 1987). In 1986,
Higher Education Minister Alain Devaquet proposed to make
university admission requirements more stringent by increasing
fees and developing a two-tiered uni versity system (Ireland,
1987:464). More than 500,000 universi ty and secondary-school
students· marched through the streets of Paris protesting Devaquet's
proposal (Dickson, 1986). This genuine revolt from the base
rejected both the reactionary reforms imposed from above by the
conservative Chirac government and the bureaucratic leadership of
the Socialist and Communist Parties (Ireland, 1987:465). Following
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the protests, Prime Minister Chirac withdrew the contested
proposals and Minister Devaquet resigned; autonomous student
struggles engendered outcomes furthering student interests.
The· social capital perspective' helps us understand these
recent student protests as examples of unwaged workers resisting
capital's attempts to create an under-class of students and further
divide the working class. Student demonstrations opposing a two-
tiered university system parallel waged workers' struggles against
two-tiered wage systems. In both cases, capital's strategy has been
to divide the working class further, forcing workers to compete
against one another for preferred socio-economic rewards, In the
case of the student protests, the working class counterattacked,
aiming to resist capital's division of its ranks by all means
necessary. Following the social capital perspective, the student
revolts of 1968 and 1986 exemplify the autonomous struggles of
unwaged workers (students) against capital's imposition of work
and bureaucratic control by the state, as well as the Socialist and
Communist Parties.f
CONCLUSIONS
66 67
1
!
Mid-American Review of Sociology Political Decentralization In France
the key to poli tical practice inheres in the construction and
maintenance of an open constitutional democracy (such as ensuring
voting rights to minorities) and in the full participation of an
informed electorate. Because pluralists ignore entrenched
institutional economic and class in terests, their poli tical practice
derives from an overly romanticized conception of state and
society.
From an elitist point of view, those who control the means of
administration make decisions and institute policies. Thus, elitist
political practice concentrates on capturing institutional forms of
power, especially the political institutions of the state. However
since elitists argue that non-elites have little chance of capturing
the means of administration, elitist theory implies that the masses
have little recourse to effective political action (e.g, Domhoff,
1983:203-223).
Ruling class perspectives maintain that political practice aims
at control of the means of production, and often assert that mass
political action requires the leadership of a workers' party.
However, where this form of praxis has succeeded, the despotism
of private ownership typically has been replaced by the tyranny of
Party and state posing as the vanguard of the working class but
acting as an abstract mega-capitalist. Similar to elitist practice,
this variant of ruling class theory implies that individuals acting
together have few options for decisive political action apart from a
workers' party or similar revolutionary vanguard.
Beyond its alternative analysis of class struggle, social capital
provides alternatives for praxis as well (Zerowork, 1975:1-6).
Including both waged and unwaged workers in its conception of
the working class, social capital theory affirms the working class is
not monolithic and exhibits diverse interests (Cleaver, 1979). It
emphasizes .that the interests of certain, sections of the working
class must not be sacrificed for the benefit of others. The
autonomous struggles of unwaged students, the jobless, and women
burdened with domestic labor are as crucial to the struggle against
capital as are the battles of waged workers for higher earnings,
safer working conditions, and shorter hours. More generally, social'
capital suggests that waged and unwaged workers alike contest the
imposition of work by and for the benefit of capital. This means
that individuals endeavor to become more than good citizens, as the
pluralists would have it, or good workers, as certain ruling class
theorists suppose. Social capital theory challenges the working
class to free itself from imposed work and pursue the full potential
of its creative faculties.
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FOOTNOTES
1. During the revolution, France was divided into 83 departments
(districts) for administrative convenience.
2. The commune is the smallest unit of local government, the town
or township level of government. France has some 36,000
communes today.
3. See Rousseau and Zariski (1987:Chapter 4) for a' detailed
analysis of the Socialist Party's decentralization policies and
their origins.
4. These assumptions imply that capital must struggle both to
influence the state and the working class. Although capital
attempts to be omnipresent, completely dominating all aspects of
political, economic, and social life, we do not assume that
capital always enjoys success. Therefore, political processes and
outcomes are characterized by active class conflict, rather than
determined by capitalist or elite domination.
5. Similar student protests in Mexico during 1986 (see Castaneda,
1986) suggest the broad international utility of the social capital
perspective.
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BRINGING THE ECONOMY BACK IN (AGAIN):
CONCEPTIONS OF THE CAPITALIST STATE AND THEIR
RELEVANCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
Patrick J. Akard
University of Kansas
Mid-American Review of Sociology, 1986, Vol. XI, No. 2:75-1'00
The economic role of the state has been the central issue in
recent debates on public policy. This is particularly manifest in
the numerous works on "reindustrialization" that have .inundated
the media, business press, public policy discussions, and best-seller
lists. These seek to explain the recent stagnation of the U.S.
economy, and offer corr.esponding policy recommendations for
"economic revitalization." Whether conservative "free market"
proponents, "corporatist" advocates of a national "industrial policy,"
or social-democratic critics of capitalism, all focus on the
problematic relationship between the state and the economy in the
contemporary U.S.--though they disagree on what that relationship
is.! . .
At the same time, there has been a great deal of work on the
state in recent political and sociological theory. Previous
conceptions of the nature of the state in a capitalist system have
been challenged, and new ones formulated. Much of the
contemporary debate on the theory of the capitalist state is directly
relevant to the recent political and economic upheavals in the U.S.
As usual, however, the separation .of "theorists" and "policy
analysts" in social science has' precluded much contact between
these two bodies of literature.
This paper considers one of the central issues in
contemporary political sociology--the question of the "autonomy" of
the state--in the context of recent political and economic events in
the U.S. A number of political theorists have challenged the
dominance of what they see as an overly-deterministic conception
of the state. They advocate "bringing the state back in" by
emphasizing the independent influence of state structures, state
manager, political parties, and "political" factors over other social
and (especially) economic phenomena. Some of this work stressing
the "primacy of the political" addresses the deficiencies of previous
mainstream orientations in political science and political
sociology--for example, pluralist conceptions, or structural-
